Somalia's Reconstruction:
Beyond IGAD and the European Union's Peace Dividend

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Introduction

> How do we strength the state responsibly, when all too often state capacity is used not to track the behavior of criminals, but rather the behavior of political opponents? In other words, how can we strength the law enforcement capacity of weak states and avoid the mistakes of the Cold Water, *when in the name of resisting and containing Communism, this country assisted some truly appalling regimes in Africa -governments that pursued policies antithetical to our national values, leading to disastrous results that ultimately did not serve our national interests*.
>
> > Senator Russ Feingold,
> > Subcommittee on African Affairs
> > Hearing on US Policy Options in
> > Somalia. February 6, 2002.

The cold war and super power rivalry had catastrophic consequences for some countries. Somalia, Afghanistan, and Cambodia are in a distinct league among the ill-fated nations. Somalia is peerless, among these unfortunate societies, in being the only country without national political authority and public institutions. The human cost of this calamity has been incomprehensible and its legacy will be with Somalis for a very long time. Who is responsible for Somalia's abominable circumstances? I would argue that the former Soviet Union and the United States who dumped hundreds of million of dollars in weapons and that supported a brutal dictatorship bear some responsibility, as Senator Feingold remarks underscore. But Somali political/military leaders and the public are ultimately culpable. The collapse of the Somali State in 1991 and the decade of statelessness have taken a horrific toll on the population. The poor and vulnerable majority of the Somali people have singularly suffered from the loss of statehood, but their vulnerability will not remain theirs alone for much longer. International criminals

and drug lords will find a haven in stateless Somalia. This brief essay has four purposes. First, it sketches the outline of the extant explanation of why the Somali state disintegrated. Its second concern is to discuss why Somalis have failed to rebuild their public authority. Third, it evaluates whether IGAD's strategy or the EU's peace dividend advances Somalia's rehabilitation. Finally, it will identify policies and actions that the international community could undertake to help **Somalis build** a democratic and sustainable political order.

Internal Causes of National Disintegration

Observers of African nation-states assumed that Somalia was unique in the continent as the population **shared many social and cultural traits**, such as language, mode of economic production, and religion. Given its social and cultural base, the state was thought to be viable. Just over a decade ago, it would have been impossible to imagine the disintegration of Somalia. Today, many political commentators are similarly strident about the clan structure being essential to the very essence of a Somali community. The commentators argue that t is not possible to reconstruct Somalia without the **clan being the basis of the new polity**.

These elementary arguments are grounded on a limited understanding of Somali political history. They also lack an appreciation of the art of state formation. The "shared social and cultural heritage" thesis fails to recognize that common traits can **form a necessary, but insufficien**t foundation for building state institutions that cater to the community's collective interest. The ability of cultural resources to bind a society

together depends on how they are used. The socially unifying appeal of these resources declines when *mined continuously* without the society reinvesting in them. The *callous exploitation of shared cultural resources* not only impoverishes their richness and resiliency, but may also turn them into a national liability. This is exactly what has transpired in Somalia. However, if a society does not take the long-term vitality of cultural resources for *granted*, but continuously and consciously replenishes their richness and value, they will continue to be a source of social cohesion. This means that a society must actively nourish inherited shared values and develop new ones that reinforce the appeal of this common heritage.

The most important addition to Somalia's pool of shared resources since the middle of last century has been the (colonial) state and its institutions. The imposition of the state, in its colonial and post-colonial forms, induced social processes *that had the potential* to reinforce and positively transform shared-values in an inclusive manner, or to undermine and distort their appeal to the entire community.[1] *The state's impact on the vitality of shared values, depends on whether the authorities use public institutions to nurture a common or sectarian agenda. The diminishing attractiveness of traditional shared Somali values is not due to Somalis' primordial predisposition for divisiveness.* Instead it is due to the misuse of public institutions and resources for private gain. Moreover, the use of public power to intimidate and punish those who try to protect common causes has delegitimated public authority and the worth of these public resources. The authorities' cynical manipulation of shared values and traditions to mollify public distrust and prolong their tenure further alienated the public from the state. The

public is not only hostile toward the state but is deeply mistrustful of anyone who attempts to mobilize them on the basis of shared sentiments.

Traditional analysts of Somali politics have cited two occurrences as evidence of the Somalis' sectarian nature despite the fact that they share a common language, culture, and religion[2]. These occurrences are the Somalis' recent antipathy toward the state and nationalism, and the warlords' success in carving up the country into fiefdoms. Advocates of the clanist thesis wrongly insist that a clan based federal dispensation is the only political formula that will reunite Somalia. They erroneously assume that genealogical differences led to Somalia's disintegration[3]. I argue that the causes of the Somali calamity are: state leaders' failure to nurture shared cultural and social commonalties and sectarian entrepreneurs' instrumentalist accentuation of social differences. ***The innocuous differences' transformation has become lethal weapon in the hands of sectarians.***

The state's credibility has been destroyed because it failed to guard common interest and the erosion of social solidarity based on inclusive values makes Somali reconstruction an awesome task. Putnam's thesis that building a stock of social capital requires many decades seems to apply here[4]. If Putnam is right, it will take a long time for *generalized* social trust to develop (millenarian). Tendler's thesis that public trust can be built in a relatively short time seems more feasible[5]. These authors' seemingly contradictory positions are reconcilable. Communities and states can steadily generate trust and confidence for common cause. Shared values across communities are the basis of civic bonds and trust in a *society*. But the state must take leadership in nurturing society-wide civic bonds. Communities, in turn, must scrupulously monitor state actions

to ensure that public institutions function in ways that consistently enhance the quality of those shared values. Such partnership between state and community will facilitate social capital generation in relatively short time[6].

The following discussion points out that building people's confidence that they can work together for common good and establishing their trust in public institutions is not necessarily a long-term proposition. I argue that there is one critical factor to reversing the trends of the last three decades in Somalia. That key is to create institutions that constrain sectarian entrepreneurs while strengthening shared values and hopes. Such institutions must enhance accountability, rebuild public trust, and advance a common agenda.

The rest of the discussion is divided into four parts. The first section panoramically sketches Somali elite politics and describes how they destroyed public trust for state institutions and undermined the importance of shared norms. Section two looks at the terrorism in Somalia and its relations to Islamic practice. Part three evaluates failed the underlying causes of failed attempts to reconstitute national authority in the country. The conclusion entertains what must be done to secure democracy and peace in Somalia.

Elite Politics & Destruction of Public Trust

A key development problem in Africa is the discrepancy between states' claims and the impacts of its actions on communities. Most Africans assume that state managers care little about the common good and are in business for themselves and their clients.

Somalis are extreme among Africans in this antipathy. Hostile feelings toward state authorities rarely existed 40 years ago when most countries become independent. Hoping to replace colonial bosses with regimes that respected Africans' dignity and managed public affairs justly, Africans routed colonial authorities. This section briefly sketches how the mismanagement of public institutions in Somalia turned Somalis' hope into despair.

Public despondency in the continent is deep. In fact, today citizens are shocked when they receive courteous and efficient service from a public servant. This sharply contrasts with popular opinion from forty years ago when people embraced the nationalist project[7]. Somalis shared this optimism in 1960 and their nationalism generated incredible fervor and social unity that reflected *their hope for democracy and development*. However, the sanguine public did not realize that their hopes depended on the quality of the national elite and intra-elite politics. Somali elite politics manifested two contradictory political and economic tendencies. One tendency emphasized a Somali-wide identity, nationalism, the protection of common good, and justice in the dispensation of the rule of law (civic movement). The other predisposition embraced sectarianism and clanism, driven by individualistic interest without regard for community wellbeing (sectarian movement).[8]

The Somali-wide versus the sectarian trajectories were opposing post-colonial national strategies embedded in the new republic's fabric in 1960. The struggle between these two elite political projects marked the state's institutional history since 1960. Four elite qualities shaped the civic or sectarian impacts on public institutions and public trust. These characteristics were: the degree of elite unity or lack thereof; the legitimacy of its

leadership within the group and the public; the leadership's understanding of the nature of the collective project; and clarity of their strategy in translating plans into concrete reality.

The independence euphoria and the unification of former British and Italian Somali lands in 1960 generated national cohesion that masked differences between groups with competing agendas (1960-64).[9] The patriotic fervor induced by the 1964 war with Ethiopia prolonged this spirit's life span. But appearance of nationalist solidarity was short lived[10]. The regime's leadership enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy with the public, however, the leadership showed no sign of understanding the particulars of the nationalist project. Moreover, the leadership did not articulate a clear road map for achieving its development agenda. Consequently, it undertook minimal institutional reform, other than streaming lining the British and Italian colonial administrations into a single apparatus[11].

The second republic (1964-7) is singularly unique in postcolonial Somali history on two accounts. First, the 1964 national parliamentary elections exposed the ascendancy and strength of the sectarian forces and the opportunistic tendencies of many elite members. The number of political parties proliferated into 24 as individual elite members tried to gain a parliament seat in order to loot the public purse. Only four of these parties succeeded in winning parliamentary seats. Second, the nationalist forces made their last systematic effort, after the elections, to contain the sectarian tide from engulfing public life. The nationalist forces attempted to insulate the civil service from undisciplined politicians' particularistic intervention. President Osman and Premier Hussein wanted to do more than integrate the two former colonies. However, this regime failed to enunciate

its development project clearly. In spite of this weakness, the Hussein government understood that to make public institutions effective and root out corruption and the abuse of public power, it needed to *bureaucratize* its institutions.

Two of the Premier's initiatives signaled his institution-building strategy. First, he appointed his ministers based on their professional skills. As a result of this action, a significant number of key portfolios went to northerners. Many southern MPs were not happy with the ministerial line up and accused the Prime Minister (PM) of favoritism. One of the northerners, Mohamoud Issa Jama, who was nominated as minister of agriculture, gave up his post so southerners could be accommodated. The second and most important decision was to reform the civil service and establish a professional and autonomous Civil Service Commission. The Commission's mandate, with technical assistance from United Nations experts, was to professionalize the service. The Commission started reevaluating all major posts in the civil service and the qualifications of their occupants. It discovered that many senior officials were unqualified and ill equipped to lead their departments. Consequently, the Commission recommended relieving these individuals of their responsibilities for two years and giving them an opportunity to improve their competency. The Prime Minister heeded this advice and dismissed nearly 200 senior officials over the next year.[12] All those discharged were from the republic's southern region except for two northerners.[13] Those discharged were some of the southern elite's leading elements.

This attempt at institutional reform was short-lived as an administration less concerned with curbing corruption and insulating public service came to power after the 1967 presidential election[14]. President Osman appeared to have lost the election for three

reasons. First, he was competing with a popular former Prime Minister. Second, Premier Hussein's anti-corruption drive and termination of a significant number of southern elite members from the civil service alienated a powerful political constituency. Third, candidate Sharmarke and his allies promised seductive rewards for parliamentarians who voted for him. Sharmarke's promises worked their magic, and he captured the presidency with a slim margin.

President Sharmarke and his Premier, Egal, understood the volatility of the electoral process. Immediately, they started planning for the 1969 parliamentary election. The elite, and especially those in parliament, failed to be united by anything except their willingness to trade off any public resource for private gain[15]. The leaders of the government, having fueled this tendency during the presidential election, knew the only way to remain in power was to appeal to each MP's material interests, tantalizing them with rewards and promises. Given these priorities, the regime abandoned civil service reform initiated by its predecessor. Corruption and the politics of divide and rule, rather than fostering inclusive collective project, became the name of the game[16].

The 1969 parliamentary elections proved that the elite's sectarian faction had gained the upper hand. The struggle for individual political survival divided **and** united this cohort. The political process disintegrated as 62 political parties fielded candidates. Ambitious individuals who were not selected by the main parties formed their own. These so called opposition parties won 50 of the 123 seats. However, as soon as the election was over, the opposition MPs abandoned their parties and joined the ruling party. The shift of political "loyalty" was induced by the clear recognition that MPs could access public largesse only if they were associated with government. Moreover, political

bosses in power enticed these MPs to join the ruling party. The only opposition member of parliament was former Prime Minister Hussein.

The military took control of the government before the sectarian stampede could run its course and the public poured into the streets to rejoice over the termination of corrupt politics. The military regime enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy during the first years of its tenure. The swift and effective management of the 1973-4 drought, the introduction of Latin scripts for the Somali language and the expansion of education and other services increased the regime's popularity. The military, with the Soviet's prodding, adopted socialism as its development strategy. However, the government showed no sign of comprehending what socialism meant in the Somali context as it blindly adopted Soviet tested but unproductive economic management methods[17]. Consequently, it retained, at first, the rudderless public service policy of the last civilian regime.

The Somali army's defeat in the Ethiopian-Somali war, 1977-78, brought the regime's honeymoon period to an end. The government discarded citizens' rights and any pretence of supporting inclusive national project as the public and significant elements of the military challenged the regime's right to govern. As paranoia engulfed the leadership, it began a massive campaign to put loyal supporters in all key government positions without regard to merit or due process. The majority of these new and quickly promoted public employees did not have the skills or experience to manage public affairs, further damaging competency of state apparatus. Having lost legitimacy, the regime used military power to punish entire regions and communities deemed disloyal. A most sectarian and brutal use of the military machine occurred in 1988 when Hargeisa and Burao, two of the country's largest cities, were destroyed. These cities were targeted for

special treatment after one of the opposition movement's, Somali National Movement (SNM) guerrillas impetuously entered them. The local populations were devastated, and survivors fled to Ethiopian refugee camps.

The nation bled for another three years before the regime was finally ousted from its final stronghold in the capital. By then, unfortunately, all national institutions were ruined. Moreover, the separate opposition movements, who collectively destroyed the old regime, were sectarian themselves and had no national reconstruction program. They fought each other for control and in the process ruined what little the old regime left behind. The prolonged civil war and the *terror* instigated by warlords reversed integrative national processes. Warlords and factions leaders fragmented the country into "clan" fiefdoms that led to carnage and the worst famine in Somali history in the Biadao region. Most reasonable Somalis agree that Siyad Barre's regime was dreadful, but it was better than what followed it. They often note that "a bad government is better than none." Every government since independence made some contribution to shared values, except for two: the 1967-69 and those dominated by warlords and faction leaders.

The people's antipathy toward public management is the antithesis of how Somalis felt about the nationalist project in 1960. The thoughtful citizen who takes account of what unifying values have been added to the old stock of shared traditions since independence will find slim pickings. The first reinforcement of shared traditions was the unification of British and Italian Somalilands in 1960. Northern Somali leaders spearheaded this act. The second episode is President Osman's dignified and democratic departure from the presidency in 1967 after failing to be reelected. President Osman's compliance with the constitution signaled that no one was above the law of the land.

Somalis now recognize him as an exemplary founding president whom they wish others emulated. A third tangible addition to the Somali social capital was Premier Hussein's valiant effort to professionalize public service and insulate it from sectarian political intervention. Premier Hussein's qualities underscore the character of public service for which most Somalis so desperately yearn. The fourth and perhaps the most enduring addition to Somali social capital was the development of orthography for the language. The writing of Somali language is taken for granted to the extend that even faction leaders desperate to create their little "homelands" use it as their official medium.

Somalia's social and political balance sheet since independence is dominated by liabilities that have significantly diminished the nation's sense of a common destiny. The murderous and illegal uses of state power and sectarian exploitation of national resources figure prominently in the population's collective memory of the last three decades. Moreover, incompetent management of public affairs for most of the country's recent history has eroded Somalis' communal self-confidence. *Undoing these liabilities is what reconciliation and reconstruction is all about.* Creating common projects that are effectively and fairly managed is essential to establishing collective self-worth and rebuilding inclusive polity and identity.

Failed Attempts to Rebuilt the Somali State

Two theses guided nearly all regional and international efforts to help Somalis reconcile and rebuilt their national government. The first attempt assumed that the warlords were the key political and military actors. Consequently, they were invited into

a number of conferences in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Egypt. Whatever agreements were reached in these meetings none was implemented to start national reconstruction. The second effort at national reconciliation was built on the supposition that clan conflict was the essence of the Somali conundrum. Two of the three most "successful" reconciliation attempts were held in northwestern and northeastern Somali towns of Borama and Garowe. These conferences led to the formation of two regional administrations and the restoration of *fragile peace*. The Third trial used similar "clan" affiliation as the basis of inviting delegates from most parts of Somalia. This conference held in Arta, Djibouti, was the *most inclusive* Somali reconciliation meeting since 1991. The conference produced the most representative (in clan and gender terms) post-1991 political agreement that led to the establishment of a transitional national government (TNG). Although the initial Arta agreement stipulated that the TNG would be headquartered in Baidoa, the decision was not honored when the operation was moved to Mogadishu, the old capital. Unfortunately, Mogadishu remains divided due to the violence and the military strength of the warlords in and around the city, the TNG's lack of resources, incompetence, corruption and unwillingness to use force to subdue them.

These three "relatively" successful attempts to rebuild public authority restored peace in areas varying in size but none of them has legitimacy in all regions. The TNG has the widest legitimacy with the Somali population but controls the smallest territory among the three. In spite of these difference the three operations share the character that clan provides the basis for selecting members of their organs. This foundational attribute of the three administrations provides them a certain degree of stability, *but that undermines their ability to build civic, effective, and inclusive public institutions*. First,

the clan as a basis of representation may be an expedient tool to restore some semblance of democratic facade. However, the establishment of clan identity as the way to allocate both political offices and civil service posts is divisive. This creates a system of rights and job entitlements based on exclusive identity, which forecloses the formations of public order based on equal rights of all citizens. Second, this scheme completely distorts the function of public institutions from that of serving citizens to being purely rent havens for office holders and their key genealogical clients. The consequences are the development of public establishment that is incapable of rebuilding public trust let alone engage in development and enhance the competence of the public sector. In essence this clan-based system has produced a poor Somali version of the infamous South African "Bantustans."

The most advanced regional authority based on clan system is in northern Somalia with Hargeisa as its capital. The authority was nominally established in 1990, but it did not become stable until after the regional conference held in Borama in 1993. In spite of nearly a decade of stability only a formal governmental structure has been created. Due to the lack of real institutional order and professional logic, the region made little progress in building governmental capacity that could reinvest in inclusive shared values.[18] Recent events in Hargeisa testify to the chaotic and arbitrary political order. The regional charter promulgates that new provincial and administrative districts could be formed only after the ministry of interior undertakes careful study. The proposal then goes to the assembly after the cabinet approves it. The proposition becomes law only after parliament votes on it. All districts and the province created since the regional authority was formed have failed to follow the steps the charter mandates. The late regional president unilaterally

degreed the establishment of a province, namely Sahel, and several districts without the consent of the interior ministry and the regional parliament. Informed people have told the author that the regional president acts alone to satisfy clients and insure his re-election bid this year. Many of the new districts lack both resources and hinterland to administer. It appears that the regional administration in the north is not a transparent and accountable system. Furthermore, the ministries and district administrations are balkanized and therefore reinforce sectarian and exclusive identity thus undermining the regional scope of the project.

The northeast region suffers from the same maladies as the north. The ministerial portfolios are distributed along clan lines. This means each ministry becomes a tribal fiefdom and thus its occupants and their clients serve themselves and are immune to public scrutiny. This is not a recipe for rebuilding inclusive political dispensation.

Finally, the TNG shares many of the characteristics of the regional administrations *with the significant exception that it is a more inclusive and more representative national body*. The TNG administration has created the largest number of ministerial portfolios of any country, approximately seventy. According to the authorities, the rational for the exceptionally large number of portfolios in an impoverished country and administration is to secure the peace and bring all clans and warlord into the national fold. Furthermore, professional administrative posts were/are allocated along the same lines. The TNG's administrative structure thus suffers from the same ailments as those in the north and northeast: balkanized administration, absence of professionalism, merit, and corruption. This bodes ill for restoring the public's trust in national institutions, and resurrecting national identity based on inclusive shared values.

Policy Options: Piece Meal versus Comprehensive Strategy

The underlying assumptions of the three semi-successful attempts to rebuild Somalia are the wrong foundations for reconstructing Somali national authority and securing sustainable peace. The availability of automatic weapons in every household and business in the two regional administrations and the occasional flare up of violence indicates the shallowness of the peace. Their inept, clan-based and corrupt administrations have no chance of developing into a viable and vibrant public authority that could permanently tame violence and inspire public confidence. In contrast, the TNG has wider national support from the public. However, due to its exclusive identity-based political representative and administrative order, corruption and incompetence, it has failed to sustain the public's confidence after the TNG's formation in Arta.

There have been three competing policy options under consideration for the past decade:

I.   *Building Blocs*:

The so-called building-bloc approach to reconstruction is supported by warlords, faction leaders, Ethiopia, staff of international agencies and NGO's that benefit from the absence of central political authority, and colonial anthropologists. The fundamental assumption of this approach is that Somalia consists of discrete territorial based clans, which the post-colonial dispensation failed to take into account. The state's failure to integrate clan reality into the way it administered the country ultimately led to the Somali disaster. The upshot of this proposition is that local (clan) authorities should be rebuilt

and they should subsequently negotiate the nature of national authority. The so-called clan or building-bloc based reconstruction strategy is inherently defective and is not worthy of further consideration as the aforementioned discussion of TNG and regional administrations indicates. If "clans" were the core of the conflict then the struggles of the last decade should not only have produced peace *within* communities but effective local administrations.

II.   *IGAD and the Regional Approach*:

The IGAD strategy aims to find a solution to the Somali problem that is acceptable to Ethiopia, Djibouti and all Somali groups. This approach is fatally deadlocked due to the mutually exclusive positions of Djibouti and Ethiopia . I have already noted the weakness and strength of the Arta approach. The Building Bloc approach Ethiopia favors is akin to the regional (Hargeisa/Garowe) project whose severe weaknesses were discussed earlier. The worthy efforts of President Moi's government to push the reconciliation process further, notwithstanding, IGAD has neither the moral force or political and material resources to help civic Somalis overcome the political barriers created by warlords and faction leaders.

III.   *EU and the Peace Dividend*:

This is a welfare-based approach to Somali reconciliation and reconstruction. Its humane thrust is worthy of strengthening. Its purpose has been to invest resources in peaceful regions of the country in the hope that such investments will enhance local capacity for sustainable peace and economic development. Secondly, it is intended that

violence-ridden regions will be persuaded by the peace investment's benefits. The value of investing in peace, notwithstanding, the project's two aforementioned assumption are misplaced given the reality of political structure in peaceful regions. Moreover, warlords who dominate parts of the country and who enormously profit from the absence of peace and accountable political structures find the benefits of peace not worthy of the attentions.

The lack of credible democratic and developmental leadership in relatively peaceful regions and warlord dominance elsewhere subverts the welfare approach's reach and effectiveness. For the Peace-dividend approach to be have the intended outcome it should be wedded to a larger civic and inclusive political project. The Somali people should not be penalized because of selfishness of unaccountable faction leaders and brutal warlords.

Diplomacy: The Viable Option

This alternative considers warlords' and faction leaders' dominance (partly supported by outside interests), and armed violence as the principle cause of the community's inability to re-establish accountable and democratic political authority in the last decade. This has created circumstance in which the rule of the gun rather than law is supreme. Moreover, there are signs that some drug dealers and environmental terrorists are finding home in some parts of Somalia due to lawlessness. The danger is that, without national authority accountable to the local population and the international community, these criminal activities and more menacing others might not only find refuge, but also establish bases in the country. The biggest *immediate* worry is not about terrorist

relocating in Somalia, but drug lords routing their trade through Somalia or local entrepreneurs figuring out that drug production is a lucrative enterprise. The latter is particularly possible given the wide spread use of Kat in the country and the surrounding region.

Conditions in Somalia indicate the confluence of the international community's interest and that of civic-mined Somali people: establishing democratic national authority. Creating a civil political climate that is conducive to open dialogue in order to peacefully reconstruct national authority requires disarmament in the country. The weak Somali civic movement is incapable of undertaking this massive job. The international community alone, with USA and EU leadership, can muster the necessary strength and resources to successfully undertake this task. Moreover, it can definitively use its diplomatic weight to impress on Somalis that the only government it will recognize is the one that emerges from a peaceful conference of this civic movement. There is little doubt that this diplomatic ultimatum will convince the intransigent, corrupt and sectarian entrepreneurs that their old ways will not be tolerated any longer and their only choice is to constructively participate in a peaceful and democratic process*. Diplomatic recognition is a vital non-military tool at the disposal of the international community that has not been effectively used so far.* The international community can demand certain conditions to be met in the national conference once Somalia's future diplomatic status is made unequivocally clear. First, the conference must not last longer than three months and should *use Arta's achievement as the point of departure*. Second, the government formed must not have more than 20 ministries and ministers and that its tenure is limited to five years. Third, those who serve at senior political capacities during

this period will not have the opportunity to hold such offices again for the following decade.

The prospect for rebuilding political and civic life in Somalia is absolutely dim without disarming the warlords and the population. This process, fully supported by the international community but implemented by Somalis should start once a recognized government is selected. Disarmament must be thorough. In addition, the international community *should* be fully engaged during the first five years to help establish an effective police force and help rebuild the administrative and physical infrastructure of the country. The combined use of diplomatic and material resources will make the task of establishing a democratic national government in Somalia a feasible project.

Scaling up the Peace-Divident

The EU Peace Dividend approach will bear fruit if it is hitched to the above proposition in the following manner:

1. Recognize IGAD as an inept political project (despite Kenya's noble effort) driven by interests other than those of civic minded Somali people;
2. Recognize that civic action and its growth presupposes political dispensation that is democratic. That actions of local civic and international NGOs will be wasted without such political consideration;
3. **Unify** international community behind a Somali civic centered political project and commit regional interests to stay out of the Somali agenda. The key is united international diplomatic effort serious about boosting democratic politics and civic action;
4. The principal instrument of the international community in inducing the needed political transformation is diplomatic reconfirmation of the integrity of the Somali Republic and use the inclusive structure of the Arta process as a basis of rebuilding a democratic and inclusive national political dispensation. Given that the Transitional period of the Arta process is coming to an end, without the establishment of stipulated necessary institutions for the post-transitional period, provides an opportunity for civic Somalis and their allies in the international community to move things forward. This could be done by convening a national

conference akin to that which IGAD failed to deliver on. The major difference is that the international community --and not interested parties in the region-- should sponsor it (like Dayton in Ohio for Bosnia) and insist that the coalition that emerges from the conference will be accepted as the legitimate national government for all of Somalia for a limited term. (**The lessons of S/Leone beckon**). Local and national elections will then be held before the end of this period

5. Create an international commission to oversee the disarmament of militias and civilians and the establishment of integrated national police force. Here is the time to heavily invest in the consolidation of inclusive political and civic agenda. The injection of a strong diplomatic thrust will give civics and the Somali people the space and opportunity they have been denied for over a decade.

Notes

[1] Samatar, A. I. The State and Rural Transformation in Northern Somalia 1884-1986 (Madison, 1989); Samatar, A (ed). The Somali Challenge (Boulder, 1994).

[2] Lewis, I.M. Blood and Bone: The Calling of Kinship in Somali Society (Lawrenceville 1994); Luling, V. "Come Back Somalia? Questioning a Collapsed State" Third World Quarterly, 18 (2) 1997, Laitin, D. and Samatar, S. Somalia: Nation in Search of a State (Bouder, 1987).

[3] For a critical analysis of ethnicity and national development in Africa, see Mustapha, R. The House Lugard Built and the Zones of Contention: The Nigerian State in Historical Perspective. In Samatar, A.I. and Samatar, A. (eds), The African State: Reconsiderations (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2002). .

[4] Putnam, R. Making Democracy Work (Princeton, 1993). .

[5] Tendler, J. Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore, 1997).

[6] Lemos, M.C. "The Politics of Pollution Control in Brazil: State Actors and Social Movements Cleaning up Cubatao" World Development 26 (1)1998: 75-87. ; Evans, P. Embedded Autonomy (Princeton, 1995).

[7] Mkandawire, T. Globalization and Africa's Unfinished Agenda. Macalester International , 7 (1998): 71-107.

[8] This section draws on Samatar, A.I. "Leadership and Ethnicity in the Making of African state Models: Botswana versus Somalia" Third World Quarterly 18 (4) 1997: 687-707. .

[9] This division was clear even in the first Somali governments formed under Italian and British colonial masters in

the late 1950s. Hussein, A. H. (Prime Minister 1964-67) Interview October 21, 1999, Minneapolis.

[10] Major differences emerged between the President and his Prime Minister with regard to the

government's public management strategy. The President appointed a like minded Prime Minister.

[11] It must be noted that the integration of these two administrative systems into a coherent one was a major

accomplishment of the first and second republics.

[12] Several hundred junior employees appointed on the basis of clientalism were also dismissed. Hussein, A.

H. Interview October 23, 1999. Among those fired was the Primer's older brother who was hired

employed by the Italian colonial administration.

[13] Abdirazak H. Hussein, Interview, Minneapolis, October 30, 1999.

[14] Abib, 1996. He was cabinet secretary under Prime Minister Egal.

[15] Lewis, 1972.

[16] Abib, 1996.

[17] Samatar, 1993.
[18] See Salim, Z. S, State Decline and the Rise and Coming Fall of Clannist Politics in Northern Somalia. Unpublished Thesis, Oxford University Press, 2002. The thesis's is based on Fieldwork done in Northern Somalia in 2001.