

Network Paper

In brief

- This paper is one of the first attempts to put livelihoods and protection into practice as a thoroughly integrated framework. Many of the problems facing internally-displaced people (IDPs) are related to the protective environment. In such circumstances, assistance must be designed in such a way that it will promote the protection of vulnerable groups without adding to their existing burden.
- This paper is based on the findings of field research on livelihoods, protection and IDPs conducted in Kismaayo and the Lower Juba Valley in May 2003, under the auspices of OCHA-Somalia. The research aimed to obtain a clear understanding of the situation of IDPs and other vulnerable communities in Kismaayo, and of the operating environment; and to develop an operational plan to better protect and assist the internally displaced and other vulnerable groups.
- This paper begins with a brief description of the livelihoods and protection framework that informed the research, and the methodology the research employed. It then provides a brief overview of the findings and describes the concept of a phased operational plan.

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Livelihoods and protection Displacement and vulnerable communities in Kismaayo, southern Somalia

Commissioned and published by the Humanitarian Practice Network at ODI

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think-tank on international development
and humanitarian issues**

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Population displacement is a feature of many conflicts. People may flee violence or human rights abuse, or they may become displaced because the minimal requirements for life are unmet – for instance, during drought or flood, or economic upheaval. The displaced often face special difficulties not shared by other groups touched by conflict or disaster. The displaced are often disadvantaged in terms of their access to public facilities, compared to a host or indigenous community. Their location may influence their access to humanitarian assistance, and their ability to survive and regain their economic security.¹ The humanitarian challenge is to deliver assistance and protection in what are often unfavourable environments, especially when the authorities are unable or unwilling to act.

Under hostile and predatory conditions, many of the problems facing internally-displaced people (IDPs) and other vulnerable groups are related to the protective environment, and the potentially exploitative relations between them and local authority structures and host communities. A major dilemma in these situations is to ensure that humanitarian assistance – resources such as food aid, as well as activities such as healthcare or schooling – is accessible to the most vulnerable, and has the greatest beneficial impact. Assistance must be designed in such a way that it will promote the protection of vulnerable groups without adding to their existing burden.

Although livelihoods and protection have been brought together elsewhere, at least in theory,² this paper represents the first attempt to put livelihoods and protection, as a thoroughly integrated framework, into practice in Somalia, and to our knowledge anywhere. Conditions within the UN aid community are currently conducive for an approach of this nature. Respect for human rights and protection constituted one of the four main principles of the UN Somalia Country Team for 2003 (the others were HIV/AIDS, education and the provision of basic services). Furthermore, the 2003 Consolidated Appeal stated the importance of ‘assisting in the integration and protection of internally displaced populations, minorities, refugees and returnees and other vulnerable groups by enhancing protection efforts aimed at: building of local and national protection capacity; participation in governance; increased humanitarian access; awareness raising among populations and local authorities; and the development and promotion of durable solutions’.³


In June 2002, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)-Somalia convened a workshop in Hargeisa, Somaliland, to raise the profile of vulnerable populations in Somalia, and to develop a

strategic framework for UN agencies and the international community to engage with them. The workshop was attended by Somali nationals representing all of the country’s regions, as well as representatives from UN agencies, international NGOs and donors. The resultant framework promotes a cross-cutting livelihoods approach, rather than the more traditional sectoral approach (education, food security and rural development, governance, health and water and sanitation and infrastructure) used by the UN and other actors within the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB), the entity established to bring together donors, UN agencies and NGOs engaged in aid work in Somalia.

The June workshop once again highlighted the particular difficulties faced by IDPs and minorities in Somalia. It was noted that, while vulnerable communities face similar challenges across the country, IDPs in southern Somalia are particularly vulnerable in terms of their livelihood security and access to basic services due to the generally poor protective environment. While Somali refugees in other countries benefit from return and resettlement programmes, little has been done for people displaced within Somalia beyond meeting short-term needs.

An estimated 320,000–350,000 IDPs are distributed throughout Somalia.⁴ The largest concentrations are in Mogadishu and Kismaayo, with an estimated 150,000 and 15,000 respectively. While Mogadishu is considered too insecure to allow any meaningful work, Kismaayo was ‘reopened’ to international personnel of the UN by the Security Coordinator for Somalia (UNSECOORD) in March 2002 after the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA), a clan-based factional alliance, had established a reasonable degree of security in the town. It was therefore thought feasible by the Somalia aid community to start negotiating access to IDPs and other vulnerable groups in the city, and to start planning interventions. In January 2003, the UN Resident Humanitarian Coordinator and the head of OCHA-Somalia met JVA leaders in Eldoret, Kenya. A month later, the Resident Humanitarian Coordinator, accompanied by representatives from the UN Children’s Fund, the World Food Programme, the UN Development Programme and OCHA, held meetings in Kismaayo with the JVA authorities, elders and religious leaders and civil society groups (local NGOs, women’s and youth groups). This, and renewed interest by a number of agencies in Lower Juba, has provided an opportunity to address some of the concerns raised during the June 2002 workshop.

This paper is based on the findings of field research on livelihoods, protection and IDPs in Kismaayo and the Lower Juba Valley, conducted in May 2003 under the auspices of OCHA-Somalia. The research had three main aims:



- to obtain a clear understanding of the situation of IDPs and other vulnerable communities in Kismaayo, and the issues that they faced;
- to obtain a clear understanding of the operating environment in Kismaayo and the areas from which the displaced originated; and
- to develop an operational plan to better protect and assist the internally displaced and other vulnerable groups. Crucially, this plan was elaborated within a livelihoods and protection framework. Ideas for putting the framework into practice were initially developed by the research team, but this work also draws upon plenary discussions during a workshop in Nairobi on 11 June 2003 to disseminate and discuss these findings, sponsored by OCHA-Somalia.

The sensitive nature of the information contained in this report means that the names of informants and national staff participating in the fieldwork have been withheld.

The paper begins with a brief description of the livelihoods and protection framework that informed the research (Chapter 2), and the methodology the research employed (Chapter 3). Chapter 4 provides a brief overview of findings. Although this report is critical of the current JVA administration, many of the same issues applied under previous occupations. Chapter 5 describes the concept of a phased operational plan. Lastly, conclusions are drawn in Chapter 6.

Chapter 2

The analytical framework: livelihoods and protection

What is a livelihoods approach?

Several developmental and humanitarian agencies and donors are exploring the livelihoods concept and what it may mean for their policies and practice. These include the World Bank, the UK's Department for International Development, UNDP, the Food and Agriculture Organisation and WFP, as well as NGOs such as Oxfam, Save the Children (UK) and CARE.⁵

The key element in a livelihoods approach is its over-riding emphasis on *how people actually live*.⁶ The principles that underlie the approach are:

- it puts people at the centre of analysis and action;
- it is holistic, recognising that there is a multiplicity of actors, influences, livelihood strategies and outcomes;
- it recognises that livelihoods and the factors that influence them are dynamic, which means that it is inherently flexible;
- it is multi-level, in that it tries to bridge the gap between micro and macro factors and incorporate a number of different activities; and
- it is cross-sectoral in its approach to programming these activities.

Livelihoods approaches draw attention to the way people live, why they live that way, and why and how this way of life changes. The questions it asks indicate likely entry points for interventions – both short- and long-term – and their likely impact on people's lives.

To date, livelihoods approaches have been predominantly used in academic analysis and NGO practice under the guise of rural development in peaceful settings. Their adaptation for use in situations of chronic political

instability, where violence and poverty have become entrenched and where people's livelihoods are persistently or purposefully threatened or undermined, is more problematic.⁸ In terms of adapting the framework to make it more appropriate for these situations, the emphasis has been on the concept of vulnerability, components of conflict and power relations and their temporal dimensions. The contextual nature of vulnerability is now central to the livelihood model. This involves integrating a political economy approach into the livelihoods framework, looking at vulnerability both as a factor of material assets, and in terms of powerlessness, and how this changes over time.⁹ It also requires an understanding of these processes at the micro level, from the household (however defined), through to the macro-level processes that shape vulnerability and livelihood strategies.

This study includes notions of humanitarian protection in the analysis (see below) precisely as a way of describing this aspect of vulnerability. It is used also as a means of identifying the human rights claims of claim-holders and the obligations of duty-bearers, as well as the immediate, underlying and structural causes of exploitative or unequal relations and the non-realisation of rights. This should then indicate potential solutions to address this non-realisation of rights, solutions which go hand in hand with interventions designed to support material needs.

Moving beyond saving lives to adopting a livelihoods-oriented approach amid chronic conflict is clearly fraught with difficulties across all phases of activity, from information gathering to the provision of assistance.¹⁰ Investigations of livelihoods are investigations into the workings of human society, and human societies are complex – so complex and diverse that they easily break out of any attempts to confine them within neatly-drawn frameworks, categories and definitions. They are also dynamic, in a state of constant change. The approach is so broad that problems may arise in identifying the most important issues. Add to this the difficulties of working in conflict environments like southern Somalia, and it is clear that putting this framework into practice is not straightforward.

There is also the problem of overcoming the 'relief-to-development' mentality (and the so-called 'livelihoods' gap) that bedevils assistance in Somalia and elsewhere.¹¹ In Somalia this led to a somewhat artificial division of the country into three zones, in theory reflecting levels of 'political maturity' and donor budget lines: crisis (in the south of the country), transition (the middle) and recovery (the north, basically 'Somaliland' and 'Puntland'). Although this has been to a degree replaced by a distinction between the stable northern and the conflict-prone southern regions, the opportunities in the

Box 1

Defining livelihoods

A widely-accepted definition of livelihoods was given by Robert Chambers and Gordon Conway in 1991:

*a livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and access) and activities required for a means of living: a livelihood is sustainable which can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation; and which contributes net benefits to other livelihoods at the local and global levels and in the long and short term.*⁷

south for moving beyond relief-only activities, to supporting livelihoods not just saving lives, and to address the dynamics of vulnerability beyond meeting immediate material needs, have remained largely unexplored.

There is here the potential for bringing together the relatively separate realms of humanitarian and development discourses, but in a more dynamic manner than reiterating vague platitudes about disasters being merely an indication of underdevelopment.¹² An understanding of how households combine survival and risk-mitigation strategies can reveal the fallacies and limitations of (non-)linkages between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation, and in the case of situations of chronic political instability, the simplistic and now-contentious and inappropriate ‘relief to development continuum’ model that arose in the mid-1990s.

Livelihoods approaches are complex and difficult to implement. But in situations of chronic political instability and recurring crises such as Somalia, can we afford not to take such a comprehensive approach? In place of short-term and frequently ad hoc humanitarian relief, livelihood approaches provide a contextualisation of need that is often lacking in relief needs assessments.

What is humanitarian protection?

There is increasing recognition that protection, or rather its lack, lies at the heart of conflict-induced humanitarian crises. This has led to a renewed interest in international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law.¹³ The UN has adopted several resolutions on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, and on the protection of children and women. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has introduced the notion of the ‘Right to Protection’, and the Security Council has debated the scope of the international community’s obligation to protect civilians in the face of human rights violations.¹⁴ The ICRC – the only humanitarian organisation formally mandated by the Geneva Conventions to intervene on behalf of civilians or soldiers *hors de combat* in armed conflict – engages in a variety of protective actions. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) has also adopted guidelines and policy documents on the protection responsibilities of international humanitarian agencies.¹⁵

One such operational instrument, the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, combines existing international human rights and humanitarian law to provide guidance for the assistance and protection of IDPs.¹⁶ Without being a concrete action plan for humanitarian organisations in the field, the Guiding Principles have at least become a useful framework for the implementation of humanitarian programmes, as well as strengthening and complementing the protection of displaced people. The Principles cover all phases of the IDP problem, including how to prevent displacement, how to provide protection and assistance once people have been displaced, how to achieve their safe

Box 2

Defining protection

One definition of protection (and the one used here), elaborated in an ICRC-sponsored workshop, is from the IASC. Protection activities are defined as:

Any activity – consistent with the above mentioned purpose – aimed at creating an environment conducive to the respect for human beings, preventing and/or alleviating the immediate effects of a specific pattern of abuse, and restoring dignified conditions of life through reparation, restitution and rehabilitation.¹⁷

return with dignity, and alternative resettlement and reintegration.

The primary goals of humanitarian work are to protect life and health, prevent and relieve suffering, and ensure that human beings are treated with dignity. The right to receive humanitarian assistance – and the right to offer it – are fundamental principles underpinned by international law.¹⁸ In situations of chronic political instability, humanitarian needs are inextricably related to processes of violence. In these instances, violence is more than usually associated with the failure of national or other public actors including the international community to regulate violations of fundamental human rights. But protection has to be much more than an arid legalistic concept founded in international humanitarian law and human rights instruments, and divorced from the reality of humanitarian practice.¹⁹ Humanitarian protection in practice must address violations at different levels.

Protection is also closely associated with the fundamental idea of responsibility and the associated concept of accountability.²⁰ This takes two forms. The protection of vulnerable communities is, first and foremost, the responsibility of the state and national authorities. In situations of internal conflict, this same obligation adheres to non-state actors such as insurgent or armed groups. There is increasing recognition that international and non-governmental agencies bear a responsibility to identify and deliver appropriate assistance to enable better outcomes for the recipients of aid, and further their protection.²¹ This means not adding to the burden of the displaced and exacerbating tensions or violence in an already-contested environment. It also means endeavouring to adhere to the principles and standards of humanitarian action, such as impartiality and neutrality.²² The Guiding Principles do not seek to create a privileged category of person: they are based rather on the assumption that the displaced have the same rights and obligations as anyone else.

Protection and the provision of assistance have both internal and external aspects. For external actors, this means developing an understanding of governance (in its widest sense) in any given displacement context: what are the mechanisms of power and the structures within and between different stakeholders and stakeholder groups? Identifying who is responsible for protection at all levels is the first step in making them accountable, both to vulnerable groups and to the international community. By implication, in order to achieve protection in practice a shift in power relations is required.

Livelihoods and protection: bringing the two together

In many ways, livelihoods and protection can be considered two sides of the same coin. In this approach, humanitarian action and humanitarian protection informed by livelihoods analysis are not seen as separate activities, but as a complementary and synergistic approach, which integrates the ‘software’ of international humanitarian law and human rights advocacy with the ‘hardware’ of material resource provision.²³ Ideally, this would mean reducing (or preferably eliminating) the negative impacts of aid. Fine-grained analysis through the acquisition of knowledge and information should lead to fine-grained or more sensitive programming and resource provision.

This requires an understanding of the nature of conflict and the place of resources – including aid – within it.²⁴ Sensitivity to the context and contestability of aid is important if the international community is to reduce criticisms that aid fuels conflict.²⁵ Without this holistic and contextual understanding, the provision of resources may upset the already fragile (or exploitative) social balance, or make things worse than they already are, including, at worst, leading to an increase in violence and ultimately adding to the humanitarian and protection burden of those that we set out to assist.

In order to achieve humanitarian protection, it is necessary to analyse the connections between those in authority and specific target groups, so as to explore why a group has been deprived of its rights. The livelihoods approach focuses more on the constraints that prevent people from

realising their rights as a prerequisite for promoting people’s livelihoods. Although these rights are not specifically outlined in livelihoods approaches, they are an intrinsic component of them.

Livelihoods approaches help direct protection activities in practice. Adding protection to livelihoods analysis helps focus (or direct) the investigative process of fieldwork. Every IDP situation is different. Livelihood approaches allow us to contextualise these differences and identify the social, political and economic structures among IDPs, the host community and those in authority. The livelihood and protection framework helps both to meet basic needs, and to address more underlying protection-related problems.

This study suggests that the added value of a livelihood and protection framework is six-fold:

1. The identification of entry points over the short and longer term.
2. The more efficient use of resources.
3. An increased positive impact on beneficiaries.
4. The reduced risk of doing harm through the provision of aid.
5. The opportunity to build a more conducive environment for human rights.
6. The increased opportunity for actually doing good.

What can be achieved in practice depends very much upon the development of protection responses. After all, protection in theory (or policy) is quite different from protection in practice. This in turn depends upon the willingness of people and agencies to get involved in the field. It depends upon the context of conflict and the enabling environment within which protection activities are undertaken. Even though problems may be acute and immediate, they may take months or years to address.

The combination of humanitarian protection and an adapted livelihoods framework, which includes a political economy component, thus provides the opportunity for interventions that meet more than basic needs: it alters and shapes the functions of aid, and the relationships between humanitarian organisations and those who are responsible and accountable for protection.

Chapter 3

Methodology

Protection in theory is one thing; operationalising protection and incorporating protection into humanitarian response is quite another, especially when authorities are unwilling or unable to live up to their responsibilities. In a contested environment where it is believed that protection issues are not foremost in the minds of the authorities, research in this area is highly problematic. Similarly, where the provision of humanitarian assistance is perceived by one or more sides to the conflict to be politically motivated, or when the resources themselves are contested, problems may arise. These concerns dictated the research methodology employed here, and the subsequent dissemination of information, where national staff involved in the research process and key informants may face threats to their personal safety.

How to 'do' livelihoods and protection research

In the literature, there is little consensus about how to 'do' livelihoods research in situations of chronic conflict and political instability.²⁶ While livelihoods models provide a conceptual background, there is no guidance on the specific questions that need investigating; gender analysis, for example, is not an explicit component of most livelihoods models. Gaps are left to the researcher or research team to fill.

In Kismaayo, the approach used was governed by pragmatic issues of access, as well as questions around the types of data that could be collected, and from whom. One of the inherent contradictions of livelihood approaches is that, to be able to ask the right questions, researchers need to have prior knowledge of the issues to be investigated. Paradoxically, this may mean knowing the answers whilst endeavouring to abandon any preconceptions before entering the 'field'. As in all research, it is important that the methods used to obtain information and data are clearly explained in order to validate findings. This study is no exception. While it was thought that predominantly qualitative methods were the best way to engage with the complexity of issue-based livelihoods research, the techniques employed were dictated by the need for methodological flexibility to overcome these and other constraints.

While questions remain over the acceptability (or even validity) of qualitative issue-based research (such as the difficulty of replication), there is a clear need to move beyond 'fieldwork by chatting', or a set of randomly-executed interviews. Rather, it demands a rigorously thought out and structured framework for the exploration of displacement and the operating environment, which gets around potential 'gatekeepers' (those with interests

in distorting information), and illuminates the hidden voices of the vulnerable or marginalised. The triangulation of information is necessary in these settings.

The use of secondary as well as primary information sources is particularly important in contested environments where information is sensitive (for example, on illegal activities), the protection environment is poor or there is clear evidence of bias. A literature review was undertaken of several key themes and regions: Kismaayo, the Lower Juba, IDPs (the history of UN and NGO engagement, the successes and failures in Somalia and elsewhere), and on the theory and application of livelihoods, and the theory and application of protection and humanitarian assistance. In Nairobi, interviews were conducted with representatives from organisations engaged in the Lower Juba, or with an interest in re-engaging; with individuals with an interest in livelihood approaches; and those with knowledge of the Lower Juba in general and Kismaayo specifically. This first phase provided the background information from which the semi-structured questionnaires were derived.

Theoretical and practical objectives were balanced against other constraints such as time, the availability of staff (especially suitably qualified female national staff), personal safety and health, and restrictions in movement and access to particular locations and potential interviewees.

The fieldwork

Fieldwork, sponsored by OCHA-Somalia, was conducted from 11 to 26 May 2003, with the full consent of the JVA leadership. A team of six national staff (four from OCHA-Somalia and two from the Food Security Assessment Unit (FSAU), all male) was brought together for this phase. It was hoped to include a specific component on the links between gender and protection (with a national female staff member from UNICEF Somalia and one from Muslim Aid UK) within the wider study, but this was cancelled due to increasing insecurity in Kismaayo during the visit.

After an initial team-building exercise, which included a briefing on the objectives and approach of the study and a superficial 'ground-truthing' to ensure that the English used in the field questionnaires had a corresponding meaning in Somali, an initial broad overview and subsequent breakdown of the IDP camps by relative size and clan composition was completed. Interviews were then undertaken in what were considered representative camps by teams of two enumerators. Semi-structured focus group discussions were held with IDP camp committees, whenever possible including women. After mapping the

camp's social and economic structures, further interviews were conducted with representative households. This two-tier approach was used in an effort to negate or bypass the influence of potential aid 'gatekeepers'. (For a further discussion of the role of these gatekeepers see the following chapter, and for the questionnaires see the appendices.) For obvious reasons, interviews in all camps would have been preferable, but time and the security situation did not permit this. A number of camps were not visited in the Galjeecel clan area of Kismaayo due to fighting between rival militia groups; in all, in-depth focus group and household interviews were conducted in 11 camps. Fifteen household interviews were completed. Debriefings were held at the end of each day to discuss the findings and problems, to adjust the approach if necessary, and to reach a common analysis of displacement, the protective environment, and potential activities.

In all previous studies of IDP camps, no mention has been made of the timing of interviews. This study suggests that this is a major weakness, with important implications for the demographic profile of interviewees, the perceived and observed demographic make-up of camps and the provision of humanitarian assistance. Income generation takes precedence over answering questions – the likelihood is that those working or seeking employment will be out of the camps during working hours. There are also opportunity costs involved in participating in interview sessions. To minimise disturbance and to determine who would be available for interview sessions, the roles and daily work burden of men, women and children were established, and the schedules for camp committee and household interviews were arranged to accommodate these activities and routines. This often meant conducting interviews early in the morning or late in the evening, before or after work. This limited the number of interviews that could be conducted during this two-week period.

Although the focus of this study was Kismaayo, it was felt that the IDP issue could not be fully understood without at least some attempt to conduct research in other settings of displacement. Two villages from the east and west bank of the Juba river near Jamaame were chosen because they were accessible, and judged by the team members to be representative of the Juba Valley more widely.

One of the main differences between this work and previous studies or assessments is the way that a 'camp' was defined. This study used a definition that included several households of displaced persons in a former government or publicly-owned building, such as a bank, as well as much more immediately recognisable structures, such as walled camps like Dhumaase, with over 350 households. Perhaps understandably, and given the dynamic nature of displacement in the Lower Juba, the total number of camps identified in this study (23) is at odds with previous assessments, where even rudimentary definitions are not supplied: 26 (ICRC) and 17 (UNCU/OCHA).


A further weakness of much livelihoods research is an inability to combine micro- with macro-level analysis of the wider dynamics of conflict (including its political economy) and, for IDP research in particular, the multiple dimensions of displacement and the wider processes of vulnerability in general. Displacement should be analysed in a wider context to consider what has led to it, what its conditions are, and how or why this is likely to change. Displacement is a symptom of profound problems, but it may also be an outcome of positive choice. Generalised discussions about displacement do not illuminate the micro-level processes of livelihood patterns. Ultimately, therefore, this research is grounded in the experiences and perspectives of the people affected by displacement: it is a 'view from the doorstep', an explicit recognition of the complexity and diversity of vulnerable people themselves.

Similarly, most programmes for IDPs are based on the assumption that they always want to go home (in Somalia a poorly understood notion in itself). Although this may indeed be the case, it cannot be taken for granted. Nor can it be assumed that IDPs are disconnected from the world outside. The idea that the IDP camp (or for that matter refugee camp) is somehow a 'sealed container' plagues the literature, but we should not assume automatically that ties to 'home' (wherever it may be and in whatever form they may take) have been broken. Moreover, displacement may not necessarily be a temporary interruption to normal life – it may also be an opportunity for long-lasting change. This prompted several questions put to the displaced: where is home, why did you choose Kismaayo, why this particular camp, why have you moved, why don't you return, can you return, if you return what are the potential problems that you face, what connections do you have with home?

The answers to these questions have repercussions for the ways in which assistance is conceived and implemented: two extremes would suggest that the displaced may be assisted at the site of refuge with the knowledge that this is where they will permanently settle; or there is a recognition that they are in limbo, until such time as conditions are ripe for return so that their immediate basic needs are met and little else. An approach somewhere in the middle would meet basic needs, but would also make an investment in future return by raising the levels of the 'mobile' livelihood assets of human capital (education and skills training, for example). Answers to these questions would also acknowledge the role of aid resources, by encouraging further displacement because of the attractive force of aid, encouraging return by undertaking resource activities in 'home' areas, or even by encouraging permanent settlement.

These levels of analysis are brought together in Figure 1. By using a series of porous circles, this figure endeavours to portray the dynamic nature of displacement and break away from the notion of the IDP camp as sealed container. Starting from the centre of the large circle, the diagram describes the relationship between individuals (small solid circles) within a household, between households within a camp, and then

Figure 1
The Kismaayo IDP complex



between camps within Kismaayo. It also shows the possible connection to home areas and to the diaspora (for example through remittances), and the relationship between IDPs and the host community, the authority (in this case the JVA) and the aid community. These relationships are, in turn, shaped by the security, political and business environment, in Kismaayo and beyond.

Who is an IDP?

Despite the widespread promotion of rights and protection for IDPs, the definition of the term 'IDP' itself, at least in practice, is fuzzy. This lack of clarity poses problems for research, analysis and subsequent action, as previous studies in Somalia have indicated.²⁷ Internally-displaced people are, according to the Guiding Principles:

persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.

How useful for this study is this definition? One of the central problems is that the debate on internal displacement is dominated by the actors who 'invented' the IDP category in the first place. Endeavouring to render

the complexity and disorder of a disaster into a coherent system and an enabling environment, international bureaucracies define institutional tasks and create spaces of action. This creates and gives form to a particular functional interpretation of social and humanitarian reality. Ultimately, this will have implications for who is included and excluded from this process. Operational clarity and effectiveness depends upon the ability to identify, and then select and deliver resources to, those identified to be most in need on the basis of how they fit some predetermined criteria, in this case 'IDP'. These labels become defining terms for aid agencies, creating divisions of labour as actions become compartmentalised, with their own set of defining terms.

It is clear that the IDP label as it is applied in Somalia lacks cohesion and is plagued with difficulties, not least because of the complex and dynamic patterns of population movement within the country (see Chapter 4). In southern Somalia in particular, these labels become part of the common vocabulary of the disaster-affected in a bid to gain access to resources. It may be obvious, but in reality IDPs do not carry signifying markers of identification. They are often, but not always, indistinguishable from other groups, such as the urban poor. In Kismaayo, the urban poor often inhabit the same areas as those considered better off. What the homogenising label of IDP obscures may be more important than what is brought into focus. Given the difficulties in identifying and then locating urban poor and

other vulnerable groups, this study, by necessity and like those before it, focused on so-called ‘camps’ and those living in them.

While the label IDP serves its purpose in drawing attention to the plight of the displaced, and in the political sense of mobilising resources on their behalf, its utilitarian value as a prescriptive operational label for the assessment and monitoring of needs and the provision of resources is dubious. Obviously, clear distinctions need to be drawn between movement and the forced or stress migration evident in the outpouring of people from areas of conflict or drought as described in the Guiding Principles. While in theory the people-centred focus of livelihoods approaches enables this, in practice the practicalities and trade-offs of this research meant that the camps became the central focus. Therefore, those outside of the camps were generally excluded from the information-gathering exercise.

What remains, especially in terms of protection, is a determination of the degree of access to justice, employment, health and education facilities, clean water and systems of governance of the people in the camps. The displaced are, by the very fact that they no longer live in their home, and by inference clan, areas, especially vulnerable in terms of protection. Vulnerability and the degree of integration into the host community then become the defining terms of study. This, in turn, widens the information-gathering exercise, and starts to bridge the potential divide between host and displaced communities.

Participation and the research environment

Although livelihoods approaches are considered participatory, the type and level of overall participation in this study was determined by the context in which the research took place. This included not favouring one group over another, or one clan over another. One extreme example of this methodological inclusiveness was evident in interviews held with representatives from the two human rights organisations present in Kismaayo: one favouring the Marexaan-led JVA alliance and the second the former Harti-led occupation of General Mohamed Said Hersi ‘Morgan’. But it meant, at times, excluding those who would hinder information flows; so that elders of ‘minority’ clans could talk freely, meetings were held in neutral venues and behind closed doors. Efforts were made to include IDPs as much as possible, but businessmen, religious leaders, staff from local NGOs and other less prominent figures were also heard.

Interviews with multiple actors and between multiple sites allowed for a crosscheck or triangulation of findings, although this did not necessarily clarify who was being

truthful or not. It did, however, help to make sense of the contradictions and ambiguities both within and between individual accounts. In this way, a more complete and subtle picture of displacement was pieced together than would have been possible with answers taken solely from the displaced (especially in the presence of aid gatekeepers). The likelihood that the prospect of aid may inflate answers is an unfortunate element that must be considered in future studies.

Further issues and constraints

The use of the livelihoods and protection framework as the analytical approach met with several obstacles. Team members from different backgrounds each faced learning challenges. This was particularly noticeable for the OCHA staff when introduced to the livelihoods framework. All team members found the rights-based approaches to protection novel.

Second, despite our best efforts, given the short period of time to build trust and break down barriers, it was felt that certain discussion themes – the numbers of IDPs, the deplorable state of sanitation, lack of education and health facilities, or population estimates – were being developed at least partly for effect, and the team members were being addressed as potential benefactors. In addition, a constant theme was interview fatigue and disappointed expectations – after numerous studies of IDP camps in Kismaayo over the years with little concrete to show in terms of resources, there is evident dissatisfaction with agencies. Efforts must be made to coordinate information-gathering exercises to minimise this.

Third, although efforts were made to conduct interviews in multiple sites, the lack of geographic spread throughout the Lower Juba is a noticeable weakness of this study. Ideally, more time would lead to greater coverage (including the Bajuni islands, which appear to be ignored in assessments).

The last problem is to do with language. Although it is possible to function at certain levels using only Af-Soomaali (or Af-Maxaatiri), the official language during colonial and pre-war administrations, Bantu client groups speak Af-Maay, Bajuni islanders speak Swahili-based Kibajuni, and the Mushunguli of the Juba river speak Mushunguli. Effective and nuanced communication requires some knowledge of the appropriate language/dialect if any type of socio-economic, monitoring or extension work is to be successfully undertaken. However, only one member of the team spoke Af-Maay.

Chapter 4

Livelihoods and protection: study findings

What emerges from this research is a picture of complexity (and the difficulties of undertaking activities in Kismaayo). This is perhaps not surprising given the research framework. But this does not mean that the picture is so complex that nothing can be done. It raises a number of issues and potential entry points for further action.

Population movement and displacement in Somalia

The history of migration and conquest in Somalia influences everything, from dialects and language to the nature of ethnic or clan identity, land tenure and ownership rights, and the fluidity of political and clan alliances. Population movement is a common and often ‘normal’ feature of Somali society, notably among pastoral and agro-pastoral economies, where population displacements are by no means random or limitless. In its grazing, permanent cultivating and trading centres, and above all in its wells and water points, every clan and group possesses a series of points between which movement rotates. Migration and household splitting do not necessarily reflect an exception to the normal patterns of society. In agricultural and agro-pastoral populations, household members do not even necessarily live together continuously year-round: the numbers present at any given time depend largely upon the season, the nature of the productive assets available to the household, economic and employment opportunities elsewhere (most likely to be found in urban centres), kinship ties and the strength of social networks, and the nature of the shock or stress experienced.

At the height of the conflict in the early 1990s, over one million Somalis are estimated to have fled to neighbouring countries in the region and outside of Africa.²⁸ People continued to leave southern Somalia in large numbers until 1995. Others chose to move to safer areas within Somalia inhabited by their kin and extended families. Waves of displacement, and even multiple displacements, of varying magnitude continue in some parts of southern Somalia due to localised conflict, droughts and floods. Rapid urbanisation (or rural-to-urban drift in search of new or better livelihoods), refugee return and reintegration, and the continuing return of people to their home areas due to a generally improving security situation make the picture still more dynamic and complex.

Population movements into the Lower Juba and Kismaayo: a multi-clan topography

In recent decades, like the rest of Somalia, settlement patterns in the Juba Valley and Transjuba have been anything but static. The Juba Valley in particular has experienced dramatic population movements over the last

Box 3

The language of displacement

Several Somali words hint at the complexity and subtlety of population movement, even in the absence of conflict: the term *kiinaan* describes the voluntary movement of people in search of resources, from Bakool to relatives living in Bay region; *hayaan* describes a long journey; and *qaxooti* describes someone who has travelled a great distance and is destitute. Perhaps *barakac* comes closest to a Western understanding of IDP – it describes situations where people are obliged to move after having lost all their possessions.

150 years. A significant theme has been the migration of Somali clans from the more arid central, north-eastern and Ogadeni plains southwards in search of better pasturage and water. In the 1970s and 1980s, large-scale state farms and agro-industrial and refugee resettlement projects attracted settlers from other regions of Somalia.²⁹

More recently, there have been distinct waves of migration to Kismaayo (and to the camps), a consequence of conflict in the early 1990s, the El Niño floods in 1997, and conflict again in 2002 and 2003. The main areas of origin have been the Juba Valley and Gedo region to the north, Mogadishu and, further afield, Galgaduud region to the west, and Bay region to the north-east. The ‘pull’ of potential aid resources, social connections, economic opportunities and the ‘West Bank’ effect (the legitimisation of occupation), all have drawn migrants to the town. There is also continuous movement between Kismaayo and the Juba Valley to market farm produce, seasonal migration for land preparation, and the familial migration of resource sharing.

This migration has fundamentally altered the ethnic composition of the area, affecting everything from access to agricultural land and aid resources to the politics of administration. The issue of *guri* (‘local’) versus *gelti* (‘outsider’) is a profoundly important undercurrent in the region’s politics and in the competition over resources. It has also been problematic for the important issue of land tenure and access to agricultural resources. Although land grab is not a new phenomenon during the past decade, Bantu communities on the west bank of the river Juba in particular (notably between Kamsuuma and Kismaayo) have seen their land occupied by the Habr Gedir and Galjeecel and, around Buale, by Absame clans. Agricultural implements and water pumps have been looted, water management systems have fallen into disrepair, and where

land is no longer farmed it has reverted to scrub. Although some patron–client sharecropping arrangements exist on land under ‘occupation’, the collapse of plantation agriculture has dramatically reduced income opportunities.

Alongside the dramatic decline in employment opportunities due to the collapse of plantation agriculture, there has been a concomitant increase in economic migration to the urban market centre of Kismaayo. This has resulted in the movement of large numbers of clan militia and livestock:

1. **Marexaan** An estimated 4,000–5,000 households have arrived from two main directions: Awudwaaq district of Galgaduud region and Gedo region.
2. **Harti** Since January 2003, an estimated 800–1,000 families have arrived from refugee camps in Kenya (including Dadaab), from Mogadishu and from villages of the eastern and coastal areas of Kismaayo district. A further 500 former militia from Baidoa district are also thought to have arrived.
3. **Absame** From villages west of Jilib, from Buale and Doble and from some areas of Afmadow and Hagar, 100–200 households have arrived. A further 200–300 former militia have arrived in Kismaayo seeking employment.
4. **Ormaale** As a consequence of fighting in Buale, 20 families moved to Kismaayo.

Most observers agree that Kismaayo will be one of the last places in Somalia to experience peace. This is attributable, among other things, to the large number of clans (between 18 and 20), and competition for its relatively rich natural resources and the strategic and economically important



A charcoal store: wood biomass is often the only available source of fuel

seaport and airport. Although the rudimentary JVA administration in place in Kismaayo has provided order in the town (though some interviewees suggested that the JVA had at most 80% control of the militia) this seems to be devised primarily to regulate the benefits of occupation and to prevent in-fighting within the dominant Marexaan and Habr Gedir clan duopoly.

The Kismaayo complex

Ultimately, the stability of Kismaayo depends upon a fragile mix of political, militia and business actors that share a common interest – generating and using income from the ‘taxation’ of port and airport activities. The control of these resources is highly politicised (clan-based) and highly contested. The sums at stake are relatively large: in April 2003, for example, 23,000mt of sugar was imported, generating estimated ‘tax revenue’ of \$202,400; 364,903 25kg sacks of charcoal were exported, generating a ‘tax revenue’ of \$183,000. The over-exploitation of natural resources, including offshore fisheries, is much in evidence, and customary management mechanisms have been over-ridden in the interests of profit. Many areas of the Juba Valley have been stripped of acacia trees for charcoal production, the largest of the natural-resource export trades. Although this level of deforestation and environmental degradation such as soil erosion is not sustainable, wood biomass will remain the only available source of fuel for most Somali households. The charcoal trade is tied to the survival strategies of some of the most economically marginalised households, as well as to powerful vested interests. The trade provides opportunities for the urban and rural poor (cutting and producing charcoal, processing and re-bagging in Kismaayo, and portering and loading activities), as well as for groups who have an interest in maintaining the trade (transporters, brokers, exporters, the JVA and the militia).

For all its problems, the urban centre of Kismaayo remains attractive for those seeking employment and income

Box 4

Minority status and vulnerability

Somalia is one of the few virtually ethnically homogeneous countries in Africa, if not the world. Nonetheless, it has its cultural and ‘ethnic’ splits. The subtleties and implications of socio-ethnic stratification within Somali society have remained largely ignored. A number of minority groups exist, such as the Bantu (in the Juba Valley divided into the Shanmbara and the Mushunguli), Benadiri, Midgaan, Bajuni, Eyle, Tumul, Yibir and Galgaala, characterised not only by physical appearance, but also by the stigma of occupational status and long-forgotten grievances of ‘ritual uncleanliness’. The latter are often indistinguishable physically from the majority clans.

opportunities. Men are largely dependent on low-paid and shift-based work in the port (other activities include market portering, the production of lime, quarrying, building construction, seasonal farming activities and charcoal production), and women upon low-paid work as domestic servants, selling water, collecting and selling firewood, house-mudding and seasonal farming activities. Children rely on shoe-shining, begging and the collection of discarded qat leaves for resale. The sub-contracting of labour is common between stronger clans, such as the Marexaan, and the ‘minorities’, and there are frequent accounts of the non-payment of wages. For Bajuni fishermen, gatekeepers mostly control the revenue from fishing.

Conditions for IDPs

The IDP camps of Kismaayo are crowded, and most shelters are rudimentary structures made of scavenged materials. They lack adequate sanitary facilities, and the incidence of communicable diseases appears to be high, although conditions vary between camps. Many latrines have collapsed or are simply full, and have been abandoned. In some instances, communal areas outside of the camps are used as informal latrines. The domestic use of contaminated water is a major contributor to poor nutritional status. For groups along the Juba Valley unable to purchase clean water, the river provides for their needs. This greatly increases the risk of water-borne disease.

There is a common and strong desire for education amongst IDPs and other vulnerable groups in Kismaayo (as elsewhere in Somalia). In Kismaayo, where there is no free primary or secondary education, access is determined by the ability to pay for private facilities (Quranic schools cost up to SShs10,000 a month per child, and non-religious schools SShs20,000–40,000/month/child). For minority groups, including many in the camps, the ability to pay is partly determined by socio-ethnic status.



Kismaayo's camps are crowded, and shelters are built of rudimentary materials

The protection environment

Many of the problems facing IDPs and other vulnerable groups in Kismaayo are related to the protection environment. Individuals from weak and powerless clans such as the Bantu, Bajuni and Galgaala (including those in the IDP camps) rarely enjoy the protection afforded to others. These entrenched socio-ethnic divisions affect access to economic capital (such as employment opportunities); this in turn affects the degree of access (or reinforces the lack of access) to education and health facilities.

There are numerous accounts of gender-based violence: of sexual abuse in IDP camps and in the workplace. General abuse takes the form of theft, beatings, the non-payment of wages and the constant reinforcement of socio-ethnic status (through the use of terms such as *adoon* or *slave*). When human rights violations take place, in the absence of any properly functioning mechanisms for the rule of law, individuals from ‘minority’ or weak clans in Kismaayo often have little recourse to systems of justice – whether through customary law (*xeer*) or religious law (*sharia*). The subtleties of political, economic and social discrimination remain largely hidden to outsiders.

While it is easy to criticise a particular clan group or authority structure for the treatment of minority groups in Kismaayo, and Bantu and Bajuni groups have been particularly persecuted, the reinforcement of socio-ethnic status is not unusual in Somalia. Furthermore, during the 1990s conflict between the factions led by Colonel Omar Jess, Hussein Aideed and General Mohamed Said Hersi ‘Morgan’ became the defining feature of the Lower Juba, as the region endured some of the worst fighting in the civil war. The area and the town of Kismaayo changed hands numerous times. Each time, retreating militia looted and pillaged, and incoming militia did likewise.

Aid gatekeepers are an important element of the protection environment. These were seen as a potential obstacle in the research process. In terms of aid, they are generally considered a negative influence, positioning themselves prior to the delivery of assistance to the camps to take advantage of potentially valuable resources. One interviewee suggested that the gatekeepers took as much as 75% of the aid delivered to the camps.

At the same time, however, gatekeepers offer some degree of protection to camp residents, especially those from weak or minority clans. A Somali proverb describes this situation well: *Ama buur ahaw ama mid ku-tiir-sanaw* (‘Either be a mountain or lean on one’). In other words, members of

weak clans seek protection from a strong one, in terms of sheegata (adoption and client status) or, more immediately, the protection of a gatekeeper. Even though living conditions are extremely poor, many of the displaced feel safer as part of a group in a camp, receiving ‘protection’ from a Marexaan gatekeeper. Moreover, economic migrants might consider living in a camp as low-cost housing: rents for an arish (a wooden shack) are in the region of SShs40–60,000 per month, whereas a room in a stone house would cost SShs100,000 a month.³⁰ In return for this ‘protection’, and in lieu of ‘rent’, the gatekeeper will receive a portion of the assistance packages allocated to the displaced.

The implications for aid

One of the key issues raised during this research concerned the potential negative impact of aid. In Kismaayo, aid resources are likely to be a source of dispute, destabilising an already-fragile environment and reinforcing the existing socio-ethnic divisions and patterns of power. This raises a number of issues (and challenges) outlined below. One interviewee asserted succinctly that if these are not addressed, it would be like putting ‘fuel into the fire’. Rather than simply ‘rushing in’ in an ad hoc manner, this suggests a more tentative and coordinated approach to committing resources, which incorporates answers to these challenges in an operational plan.

1. How does the international community work with a de facto authority like the JVA without conferring credibility on its occupation and illegitimate administration? Although this issue is not new in Somalia, the perceptions of other (excluded) groups remain important.³¹ If this is ignored, the aid community runs the risk of adding to the security threat faced by international and national field staff.

Some interviewees suggested that potential aid flows into Kismaayo and the Lower Juba will be insignificant compared to the revenue collected from the sea and airport. What is sought by the JVA is not material assistance per se, but a reinforcement of their claim of authority in the wider Somali political arena. By working with the JVA clan duopoly in Kismaayo, the international community is, in the eyes of the clans inside and outside of Kismaayo town (whether *guri* or *gelti*), legitimising this claim, albeit inadvertently. The international community is no longer perceived to be neutral in its engagement in the region. This is reinforced by concentrating assistance in Kismaayo to the exclusion of other clans and clan areas.

To counter this, a much more transparent and inclusive approach to engagement in the region, not just in Kismaayo, is required. All clan parties in the region, *guri* and *gelti*, must be approached and brought into negotiations on the provision of assistance. This is a much higher tier of engagement than that normally considered in Somalia (where negotiations are held with local authorities

only). However, this may lead to accepting some degree of trade-off between identified needs and operational pragmatism.

2. The international aid community in Somalia falls somewhere between operational pragmatism and a principled approach (‘principled pragmatism’). But how pragmatic (or unprincipled) is the international community prepared to be? There must be a bottom line below which agencies suspend activities or withdraw. This is rarely defined, and the negative impacts of aid are rarely monitored. Consequently, the boundaries of operational pragmatism continually shift. Although this lack of clarity and consistency allows the international community to continue working in contested environments, this comes at a cost: it allows those seeking to manipulate the resources of aid to operate between these fuzzy boundaries.
3. International assistance must be sensitive to the multi-clan topography of Kismaayo and the Lower Juba in general. This means ‘thinking multi-clan’ at several levels:
 - humanitarian agencies have a responsibility to ensure that, in the hiring of national staff, vehicles and security guards, clan affiliation is taken into consideration. For example, the hiring of vehicles from only one clan in a multi-clan environment will exacerbate underlying clan tensions, increase the competition for resources, and reinforce existing power and wealth structures within the community. In Kismaayo, and in other parts of Somalia, this lack of sensitivity has led to threats of violence against national and international staff;
 - determining clan ‘boundaries’ in geographic terms and in terms of the clan make-up of, for example, administrations, local NGOs and community-based organisations to inform initial access negotiations (see above) and in the provision of assistance; and
 - multi-clan projects should be considered, following the example of several private enterprises in Kismaayo (in the telecommunications and remittance sector and in the provision of private health facilities). These have proven less prone to looting during conflict as the interests of several clans are affected.
4. Programmes must integrate protection and assistance. The incentive of humanitarian assistance provides an opportunity to put across more assertively the need for protection for vulnerable groups and to improve the protective environment. But how does the international community work with or around entrenched socio-ethnic divisions to ensure that aid resources most benefit those targeted? Similarly, how does the international community work with or around aid gatekeepers? Ultimately, we can either accept some degree of diversion (the pragmatic approach) or enforce a zero-tolerance policy (a principled approach). However, both require that effective monitoring and evaluation

indicators are applied and enforced. Furthermore, as the Guiding Principles suggest, the international community must be careful not to accord special privileges to target groups for fear of creating (or exacerbating) tensions between them and the host community.

5. The focus of humanitarian assistance is on those considered most vulnerable. To encourage local 'ownership' of project activities, the international community should endeavour to use the 'pillars' of Somali society (such as the ulamaadiin or religious leaders, clan elders and the dynamic business community) to work for the benefit of the vulnerable and the implementing agencies. Using these 'pillars' to provide resources (such as cash or credit), act as guarantors, or simply to facilitate access, transfers the responsibility and risk of potential asset loss to these intermediaries.
6. Due to the fragility of the security situation and the multi-clan topography of the region, 'mobile resources' such as mobile health clinics or veterinary services may be more appropriate than 'fixed' facilities such as hospitals. These could operate a routine multi-location and multi-clan itinerary (Tuesday in Buaale, Thursday in Afmadow, and so on) and could incorporate health education literature (on HIV/AIDS, female genital mutilation and sanitation). In case of renewed fighting, they could be 'evacuated'. This approach has the added benefit of addressing two common complaints: why do all the resources focus on Kismaayo; and why do they tend to focus on urban areas?

Chapter 5

An operational plan of action

This paper argues for an approach to programming that is incremental, based on local realities and knowledge-based operations, and where individual activities, such as agreement on the principles of engagement and disengagement or the provision of clean water and improved shelter, are integrated within one holistic operational plan. Because it seeks to address issues in a holistic and integrated manner, the operational framework necessitates a collaborative approach by a number of agencies (from the UN and the NGO community) with different, albeit overlapping, mandates and expertise. While this is a challenge in itself in terms of agency buy-in and effective coordination, it also provides the opportunity to phase the activities of agencies. Phasing is important for two reasons: first, as part of a logical process of sequencing interrelated components for strictly programmatic purposes; and second, to avoid the sudden arrival of large amounts of resources in an area that is politically fragile and potentially highly volatile, and where competition for aid resources frequently results in conflict between rival groups.

Figure 2 (overleaf) shows suggested phases and potential activities.³² The vertical thick line on the left shows initial re-engagement. The thick horizontal lines, for example the creation of humanitarian space and basic needs, show the main phases within which potential activities (the thin lines) take place. Hashed vertical lines show where a phase or activity is initiated, for example an agreement on the creation of humanitarian space and the start of activities to meet basic needs.

These cannot be seen in simple linear terms, with one activity starting after another has finished. In this plan, activities across several phases may take place concurrently in the same humanitarian space. What is important is the relative temporal position of activities and their connection to one another.


In Kismaayo, as in other contested environments, the creation of an enabling and conducive environment for the provision of material assistance and the promotion of protection must be developed to an acceptable level before these resources are committed. In addition, a coherent approach by the international community is a sine qua non for the success of principles of engagement and disengagement. These two aspects, together with skilful programming by well-informed individuals, are essential to develop a process for intervention that avoids many of the pitfalls associated with fragmented approaches with poor follow-up. This especially concerns increasing the competition for resources, leading to greater instability and ultimately decreasing the impact of aid. It should also be made clear that interventions in the operational plan would be required to be implemented in

the ‘home areas’ of Lower Juba, rather than just in Kismaayo. Equally, material assistance has to be provided to a wider community than just the IDPs, in terms of neutrality and impartiality on the one hand, but also as a pragmatic means to reduce the potential for conflict between groups, or the targeting of aid providers.

The first phases of engagement, then, would largely involve ‘software’ activities that build a conducive environment for more resource-based interventions. In difficult operating environments, the first object of these initial activities would be to establish very clear ground rules, particularly with the authorities that control territory and ‘public’ assets, such as the port in the case of Kismaayo. Ground rules would ideally identify modes of communication through accepted focal points to avoid a plethora of individuals acting without the knowledge of others; agree on the independence of agencies, for example in recruiting staff without interference from authorities or clan leaders; contextualise the normal ‘privileges and immunities’ that are accorded UN agencies and staff, such as the tax-free import of goods for humanitarian programmes; develop complaints procedures; and agree on what level of reporting is required to maintain an acceptable level of transparency. As a central part of the development of ground rules, the roles and responsibilities of the various parties need to be clearly defined to reduce the risk of misunderstandings in the future. It is important here for the various ‘non-state actors’ to commit to ensuring a level of security that enables the agencies to function. Internationally-recognised humanitarian principles would underpin the essence of the ground rules, and the process provides an opportunity to build the capacity of authorities and leadership on these principles.

The development of ground rules can lead logically to the first elements of building a protective environment. Once the ground rules have been developed, a process for building the capacity of duty-bearers can begin, typically by promoting the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. This would normally be led by OCHA, in collaboration with other agencies according to capacity. This can appear to be wildly optimistic in the kind of predatory operating environments like Kismaayo, and especially where there is likely to be resistance to ‘Western-driven’ instruments of international law. However, the engagement of religious leaders and arbiters of customary law (xeer) and secular law may place the Guiding Principles within a more appropriate cultural fabric. Of course, there is the potential for discrepancies in the detail between the three bodies of law operating in Somalia (i.e., sharia, xeer and secular law) and international law, but the essence or spirit of the laws are compatible and complementary. This process is also

Figure 2
Operational phasing and potential activities



important in the gradual facilitation of better governance structures, driven ultimately by Somalis.

Once the ground rules have been established, and work has been initiated to build a protective environment, it is important to embark on more tangible programmes on the ground. In Kismaayo, IDPs have very poor access to basic services, and their living conditions have been described as sub-human. Work with communities on improving access to these services can make a real difference to how people live, particularly their physical well-being. While providing services in Kismaayo, it would also be important to balance assistance in the wider community, especially in the 'home areas', as a way to reverse the pull-factor of the towns. Relatively low-cost activities, such as the construction of pit latrines, the provision of clean water and improved shelter, should be undertaken first. Only when these are monitored and evaluated should more resource-intensive activities follow. In Kismaayo, UNICEF would be expected to play a lead role in the provision of basic services, working both directly and through local partners such as Muslim Aid (UK). These kind of activities are high-impact and very visible, while requiring relatively low levels of resources. They are also relatively safe from potential manipulation. This can have a number of benefits in addition to the obvious, especially in building the confidence of the community. Having tangible programmes on the ground can also help in defending the software side of the process from critics.

More ambitious programmes centred on the rule of law as a means to directly build the protective environment can be phased in at this point. In Somalia, UNDP has an active programme (Rule of Law and Security or RoLS) incorporating reform of the judiciary, police reform/training and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) components, all of which have great potential to address some fundamental issues affecting Somali society, especially vulnerable communities. Having IDP issues at the heart of the programme would enable a focus on aspects such as improving access to the law for IDP women, or incorporating IDPs into the police forces, and including the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as well as human rights law as an integral part of police training. Again, it is important to emphasise that activities related to the rule of law need to be extended to other parts of Lower Juba (and of course elsewhere), as the protective environment for minorities is no better in rural areas than in Kismaayo. This level of engagement obviously requires a high level of trust and goodwill between the authorities and the international community, and this can only be built up over time. Improvements in the protective environment would be necessary to enable the next level of assistance aimed at livelihood support and development to occur with any meaning. As discussed earlier, many of the causes of livelihood insecurity are related to the protective environment and the inability of minorities/IDPs to access services and income opportunities as equals.

The next phase would focus on more structural aspects of communities' livelihood insecurity and disenfranchisement. Projects linked to income generation (micro-credit, business skills training, literacy/numeracy) would aim to make it easier for vulnerable communities to gain access to income opportunities. At the same time, this phase would also look at the integration of IDPs into the mainstream of society, either in the place where they have chosen to live, or back in their home areas. The latter would require work related to agricultural rehabilitation and development in the riverine areas. It would also require research into land issues, which would need to be resolved if a return 'home' was to be feasible. The competition for resources such as agricultural land is one of the most intractable problems of the Somali conflict. The history of settlement, migration and conquest has created a complex mosaic of land occupation and 'ownership' within and between clan groups. There is little point in introducing much-needed resources for the rehabilitation of agricultural land before these issues are tackled (see, in Figure 2, the intersection of the vertical line that indicates the completion of land tenure activity and the start of agricultural rehabilitation). These factors may well provide a pull-factor back to rural livelihoods, and would at least give IDPs a real choice about where they wish to live and invest in the future. Certainly, the creation of better conditions in the home areas would point the way to more durable solutions than previous attempts to bus the IDPs home with a return package. This phase of the plan would also have to address difficult issues such as the negative effects of the charcoal trade, especially on the environment of the area, and look into ways in which alternative income sources could be developed.

Some phases underpin others: the protective environment, monitoring and evaluation, and coordination. The achievement of a protective environment involves capacity-building and advocacy in their broadest sense. They require technical, material and financial support to equip local institutions and individuals with the resources and skills to become coherent advocates for change. Possibilities include bringing together hitherto separate camp committees and incorporating them into the protection dialogue and local systems of governance; and sample testing of rights through the use of questionnaires and focus groups, workshops, and training days. However, attitudes to socio-ethnic status require much more than quick-fix solutions.

A monitoring and evaluation component is central to the efficacy of this approach. This paper has argued that many of the problems facing IDPs and other vulnerable groups in Kismaayo relate to the linkage between socio-ethnic status and access to resources. This infers that monitoring and evaluation must move away from implementation checklists, noting the number of wells constructed, tarpaulins delivered or people fed. What is needed in addition are more subtle indicators that depict the real impact of activities. These indicators could include the

degree of access to resources based on clan representation (and particularly the degree of access that minority clans can develop); the presence or absence of aid gatekeepers and the degree of resource diversion; the scale of the security threat – to beneficiaries, staff and the wider community – or even changes in port activity. As this component underpins basic and structural needs phases, and indeed should provide the impetus for continuing engagement or disengagement, a systematic reporting system that is transparent and involves all stakeholders should be established.

Livelihoods approaches have clear implications for coordination mechanisms. This paper suggests that, ideally, there would be three interrelated components. First, a multi-agency, multi-sectoral information-gathering phase; second, a common analysis and the development of an agreed operational framework; and, lastly, the implementation of activities, including the negotiation of humanitarian space, in a cohesive, phased and coordinated manner. There are risks in the creation of

expectations among communities that are not quickly met, and difficulties associated with agency buy-in and encouraging joint programming. However, the question is whether we can afford not to invest the time and effort required to develop programmes that deliver and have high short- and long-term impact.

Finally, livelihoods approaches challenge the sectoral model of coordination that currently exists in Somalia. This paper suggests that multi-agency zonal or regional coordination structures are more appropriate, though the mobility of IDPs, and for that matter pastoralists and agropastoralists, means that the validity of rigidly applied zonal and regional units are problematic. Appropriate assistance can only be designed by looking beyond boundaries, whether these are cartographic (district, regional and national) or social (the porous nature of extended households, for example), or even to do with mandate. One implication of adopting the livelihoods approach more widely in Somalia would be a radical rethink of the current coordination structures, which are driven from Nairobi.

Chapter 6

Conclusions

In their synthesis study of livelihoods in situations of chronic political instability, Catherine Longley and Dan Maxwell raise three important questions.

1. How can livelihoods analysis be applied to conflict situations in order to understand the impact of conflict on livelihoods? How should livelihoods frameworks be expanded to incorporate conflict situations?
2. How can livelihood assessment tools be adapted and applied in conflict situations? How can questions of power relations, war economies, human rights and humanitarian principles be addressed?
3. What innovative approaches to livelihoods programming can be developed by agencies in situations of chronic conflict?

While the study described in this paper did not set about to answer these questions, in many ways it has addressed these same issues in the complex political and humanitarian environment of Kismaayo and the Lower Juba more generally.

The study adapted the conventional livelihood wisdom by including a political economy approach to better understand the impact of conflict on people's livelihoods and the power relations between IDPs and various other communities and external forces. In addition, the incorporation of 'humanitarian protection' considerations deepened this analysis by looking at power and vulnerability within a rights-based perspective, again within the overall umbrella of livelihoods analysis. The

combination of these approaches enabled the development of an operational framework that integrates material ('hardware') support to livelihood needs with the 'software' approach of protection through the promotion of international humanitarian law, human rights advocacy and the rule of law. Ultimately, we are better able to advocate for the needs of IDPs and the vulnerable in general.

Evidently, the component elements of the operational plan are not innovative; what is new is the integrated, collaborative and phased nature of their implementation. There is the potential here for an impact that is significantly greater than that achieved by isolated, ad hoc and localised approaches. Lastly, the adapted livelihood approach, in combination with the protection of human rights, provides us with a dynamic understanding of the operating environment within which the impact of aid can be more accurately predicted and monitored.

How the operational framework is actually implemented in Kismaayo and in the Lower Juba Valley, and the impact of the overall intervention, remains to be seen. There will be major challenges both within the aid community and in the operating area. Certainly, since this approach transcends specific agency mandates, ownership by implementing agencies and by donors will need to be fostered if this is to be accepted as an appropriate way forward. What can be achieved in practice depends very much upon the degree of buy-in to the process. Careful monitoring and analysis will be required to fully learn the lessons of this initiative.

Appendix 1

Camp committee/focus group questions

INTERVIEW DETAILS

Name of interviewer(s)

- a. Location of interview (name of camp or area)
- b. Date and time of interview
- c. Composition of group (number in group, and breakdown by gender)

CAMP STRUCTURE

- a. Draw a map of the camp
- b. Where are people from in this camp (region/district/village)? Also, try to find out which clans/sub-clans they are from
- c. How many people are there in this camp? How many households are there in the camp?
- d. Is this camp typical of others in Kismaayo. If NO, how is it different?
- e. How many different status categories are there in this camp? Name and list these categories (it may be by clan, economic status, occupation). Having identified these categories, list the criteria used for these categories and work out the proportion of the camp in each category

MIGRATION QUESTIONS

- a. When did the majority of people arrive in this camp (what year/month)?
- b. Where did they come from?
- c. Have any households been displaced more than once? If YES, why?
- d. Why did people choose Kismaayo? Why did people choose this particular camp?
- e. Does the composition of the camp change much? Do people come and go, and if so why? For example does the population change between the seasons?
- f. How long will people stay here and why? Do people want to go home? Is anything stopping you from going home (what worries do people have)? What keeps you in Kismaayo?

LIVELIHOODS

- a. In this camp what do people generally do to make a living (male and female, adults and children)? Does this change during the year (or between seasons)? If YES, how?

PROTECTION ISSUES

General

- a. Do people here own the land on which they live? If NO, do they pay rent (how much and who to)?
- b. What is the relationship like with the landlord?
- c. In Kismaayo does anyone look after your interests? If YES, who and in what way?
- d. Do you feel that the JVA represent your interests? What do the JVA do for you?
- e. How do you feel you are treated in Kismaayo? Are you treated the same as everyone else in the town? If NO, why do you think this is and how does this affect you?

Health – What is the situation?

- a. When members of the camp get sick do they seek help? If so, where do they go (hospital, MCH, private clinics, pharmacies, traditional remedies, or other)? If NO, why?
- b. Do you have the same access to these facilities as everyone else in Kismaayo? If not, why is this?
- c. Where do you get your water (sweet and saline) from? Is it far and how much does it cost?
- d. What do you feel about the sanitation in the camps? How many latrines are there in the camp? If there are none in the camp where are they? Work out how many people use each latrine. What condition are they in?
- e. What do you do with your rubbish?

Education – What is the situation?

- a. What do most children do during the day?
- b. If children are in school where do they go (what type of school, is it in the camp) and how much does it cost? If children are not in school, why not?
- c. Is there any training for adults in Kismaayo?
- d. Do you feel that you have the same access to education as everyone else in Kismaayo? If not, why is this?

Employment – What is the situation

- a. Are there any problems getting work in Kismaayo? Do you think that this is likely to change? If it does change how will this affect people in the camp and what will they do?
- b. If you are working, are you treated fairly? If NO, why do you think that is?

Security/justice – What is the situation?

- a. Has anyone in the camp had any problems or disputes (such as crimes against them, or problems of employment) in Kismaayo? If so, what were they?
- b. If there have been any problems or disputes were these resolved? Where did people go for help (for example, the JVA, sharia law, xeer, other)? Is there any difference between how men and women and children are treated?
- c. Do you feel that you have the same rights as everyone else in Kismaayo?
- d. What is the relationship like between the displaced people and others in Kismaayo? Do you feel safe?

GENERAL

What are your main worries and concerns about living in Kismaayo? Are these the same as other groups in Kismaayo?

Appendix 2

Household questionnaire

INTERVIEW DETAILS

Name of interviewer(s)

- a. Location of interview (name of camp or area)
- b. Date and time of interview
- c. Name of interviewee(s), age, gender, relationship to head of household, and clan, sub-clan, and sub-sub-clan of interviewee(s)

BACKGROUND

What has happened to your household over the last ten years (or before) – both negative and positive things? How has life changed for you? For example, what has been the impact of conflict, drought or flood, and has your status (economic and social) changed? If so, how?

MIGRATION QUESTIONS

- a. Where were you originally from (region, district, village)?
- b. Do you still consider that home? If YES, why?
- c. When did you arrive in Kismaayo (year/month)? Have you been displaced more than once? If YES, where and when?
- d. Why did you leave your home area? Why did you choose Kismaayo, and this camp?
- e. How long will you stay in Kismaayo and why?

LIVELIHOODS

- a. How many people were there in your household before you moved to Kismaayo and who is with you now: names and relationship to head of household, ages, gender, original occupation (before Kismaayo)?
- b. Of those with you now in Kismaayo: what is their occupation in Kismaayo and what is their income: name, occupation in Kismaayo (type of employment, business, begging, water fetching, house cleaning, none, or other), hours per day, and income SShs (per day, week or month)?
- c. Is this income variable from day to day, or week to week, or season to season? If yes, what do you do about it?
- d. If not all the household are with you in Kismaayo, where are they and what are they doing?
- e. Did you know anyone (family or friends) that was here before you came? If YES, what is your relationship to them?
- f. What were the assets of the household before the war (1990)? And before you moved to Kismaayo (type of asset, location and quantify)?
- g. What are the assets of the household now, both in Kismaayo and elsewhere (type of asset, location and quantify)?
- h. If there are any differences could you explain these?
- i. How do you use the income you earn in Kismaayo? For example, do you send any of it to household or family members elsewhere, or share with others in Kismaayo? What are your major expenses each week (food, water, rent, education, tax, health/medicine, repay debt, clothes, other (and try to quantify (proportion or actual) what is spent on each))?
- j. In Kismaayo do you receive help from anyone? If yes, from who and what form does it take (for example, the JVA, charities, UN, friends, family, zakat, food, money)?
- k. Would you consider this household to be typical compared to others in this camp? If NO, how are you different?

PROTECTION/ACCESS ISSUES

General

- a. Do you own the land that you are living on here in Kismaayo? If not, do you pay rent (how much is it) and what is the relationship like with your landlord?
- b. How do you feel you are treated in Kismaayo? Are you treated the same as everyone else in the town? For example, do you have the same access to health facilities, justice and education as everyone else? If not, why do you think this is?
- c. Here in Kismaayo does anyone look after your interests?

Health – What is the situation?

- a. When members of the household get sick do you seek help? If so, where do you go (hospital, MCH, private clinics, pharmacies, traditional remedies, other)?
- b. Do you have the same access to these facilities as everyone else in Kismaayo? If not, why is this? Where do you get your water (sweet or saline) from? Is it far and how much does it cost?
- d. What do you do with your rubbish?

Education – What is the situation?

- a. If you have children, what do they do during the day?
- b. If children are in school where do they go (what type of school) and how much does it cost? If children are not in school, why not?
- c. Do you feel that you have the same access to education as everyone else in the camp or Kismaayo? If not, why is this?

Employment – What is the situation

- a. Are there any problems getting work in Kismaayo? Do you think that this is likely to change? If it does change how will this affect you and what will you do?
- b. If you are working, are you treated fairly? If NO, why do you think that is?

Security/justice – What is the situation?

- a. Have you had any problems or disputes (such as crimes against you or members of your household, or problems of employment) in Kismaayo? If so, what were they?
- b. If you have had any problems or disputes how were these resolved? Where did you go for help (for example, the JVA, sharia law, xeer, other)? Is there any difference between how men and women and children are treated?
- c. Do you feel that you have the same rights as everyone else in Kismaayo?
- d. What is the relationship like between the displaced people and the community? Do you feel safe?

GOING HOME

- a. Do you intend to stay in Kismaayo? If YES, why? If NO, why not, where will you go and why will you go there? Does anything stop you from going home? If YES discuss.
- b. If YES, do you have any worries about going home and when you get there?
- c. If you stay in Kismaayo, what are your main worries and concerns? Are these the same as other groups in Kismaayo?

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Network Papers

Network Papers are contributions on specific experiences or issues prepared either by HPN members or contributing specialists.

- 1 *MSF-CIS (Celula Inter-Secções), Mozambique: A Data Collecting System Focused on Food Security and Population Movements* by T. Dusauchoit (1994)
- 2 *Responding to the 1991/92 Drought in Zambia: The Programme to Prevent Malnutrition (PPM)* by D. Mukupo (1994)
- 3 *An Account of Relief Operations in Bosnia* by M. Duffield (1994)
- 4 *Bad Borders Make Bad Neighbours - The Political Economy of Relief and Rehabilitation in the Somali Region 5, Eastern Ethiopia* by K. Van Brabant (1994)
- 5 *Advancing Preventive Diplomacy in a Post-Cold War Era: Suggested Roles for Governments and NGOs* by K. Rupesinghe (1994)
- 6 *The Rwandan Refugee Crisis in Tanzania: initial successes and failures in food assistance* by S. Jaspars (1994)
- 7 *Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief* ed. J. Borton (1994)
- 8 *Targeting the Poor in Northern Iraq: The Role of Formal and Informal Research Methods in Relief Operations* by P. Ward and M. Rimmer (1995)
- 9 *Development in Conflict: the Experience of ACORD in Uganda, Sudan, Mali and Angola* by ACORD (1995)
- 10 *Room for Improvement: the Management and Support of Relief Workers* by R. Macnair (1995)
- 11 *Cash-for-Work and Food Insecurity in Koisha, Southern Ethiopia* by P. Jenden (1995)
- 12 *Dilemmas of 'Post'-Conflict Transition: Lessons from the Health Sector* by J. Macrae (1995)
- 13 *Getting On-Line in Emergencies: A Guide and Directory to the Internet for Agencies involved in Relief and Rehabilitation* by L. Aris, P. Gee and M. Perkins (1996)
- 14 *The Impact of War and Atrocity on Civilian Populations: Basic Principles for NGO Interventions and a Critique of Psychosocial Trauma Projects* by D. Summerfield (1996)
- 15 *Cost-effectiveness Analysis: A Useful Tool for the Assessment and Evaluation of Relief Operations?* by A. Hallam (1996)
- 16 *The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda: Study III* ed. J. Borton (1996)
- 17 *Monetisation: Linkages to Food Security?* by J. Cekan, A. MacNeil and S. Loegering (1996)
- 18 *Beyond Working in Conflict: Understanding Conflict and Building Peace (The CODEP Workshop Report)*, by J. Bennett and M. Kayitesi Blewitt (1996)
- 19 *Human Rights and International Legal Standards: what relief workers need to know* by J. Darcy (1997)
- 20 *People in Aid Code of Best Practice in the Management and Support of Aid Personnel* ed. S. Davidson (1997)
- 21 *Humanitarian Principles: The Southern Sudan Experience* by I. Levine (1997)
- 22 *The War Economy in Liberia: A Political Analysis* by P. Atkinson (1997)
- 23 *The Coordination of Humanitarian Action: the case of Sri Lanka* by K. Van Brabant (1997)
- 24 *Reproductive Health for Displaced Populations* by C. Palmer (1998)
- 25 *Humanitarian Action in Protracted Crises: the new relief 'agenda' and its limits* by D. Hendrickson (1998)
- 26 *The Food Economy Approach: a framework for understanding rural livelihoods* by T. Boudreau (1998)
- 27 *Between Relief and Development: targeting food aid for disaster prevention in Ethiopia* by K. Sharp (1998)
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- 29 *Participatory Review in Chronic Instability: The Experience of the IKAFE Refugee Settlement Programme, Uganda* by K. Neefjes (1999)
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- 33 *The Political Economy of War: What Relief Agencies Need to Know* by P. Le Billon (2000)
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- 35 *Cash Transfers in Emergencies: Evaluating Benefits and Assessing Risks* by D. Peppiatt, J. Mitchell and P. Holzmann (2001)
- 36 *Food-security Assessments in Emergencies: A Livelihoods Approach* by H. Young, S. Jaspars, R. Brown, J. Frize and H. Khogali (2001)
- 37 *A Bridge Too Far: Aid Agencies and the Military in Humanitarian Response* by J. Barry with A. Jefferys (2002)
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- 44 *Livelihoods and Protection: Displacement and Vulnerable Communities in Kismaayo, Southern Somalia* by Simon Narbeth and Calum McLean (2003)

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- 4 *Seed Provision During and After Emergencies* by the ODI Seeds and Biodiversity Programme (1996)
- 5 *Counting and Identification of Beneficiary Populations in Emergency Operations: Registration and its Alternatives* by J. Telford (1997)
- 6 *Temporary Human Settlement Planning for Displaced Populations in Emergencies* by A. Chalinder (1998)
- 7 *The Evaluation of Humanitarian Assistance Programmes in Complex Emergencies* by A. Hallam (1998)
- 8 *Operational Security Management in Violent Environments* by K. Van Brabant (2000)
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